INTRODUCTION
The ſ duciary concept has a peculiar status in Canadian law. While the Canadian law of ſ duciaries traces its origins to the same foundation as ſ duciary jurisprudence emanating from other common law jurisdictions, the ſ duciary concept has been applied more aggressively (i.e., to a wider range of circumstances and in more unique ways) in Canada than elsewhere. Sir Anthony Mason, former chief justice of the Australian High Court, once made the colourful extra-curial suggestion that Canadian ſ duciary jurisprudence is divided into three parts: '[t] hose who owe ſ duciary duties, those to whom ſ duciary duties are owed and judges who keep creating new ſ duciary duties.' Despite the growth of the ſ duciary concept in Canada and elsewhere, a signiſ cant sense of uncertainty still plagues the ſ duciary concept.
2 Even a cursory glance at existing ſ duciary jurisprudence and commentary indicates this phenomenon. Curiously, this state of affairs has not impeded the ſ duciary concept's continued use. This is not an exclusively modern development. Nor, for that matter, is it peculiarly Canadian. 3 There has long been a greater interest in the ends to be achieved through the application of the ſ duciary concept than in infusing it with greater certainty to guide its use.
4 This is a problematic development, because, as former Chief Justice Bora Laskin of the Supreme Court of Canada once said:
. . . important as it is to know what the law is, it is at least equally important to know what the law is for. The distinction that I draw is between a purely formal, mechanical view of the law, antiseptic and detached, and a view of the law that sees it as purposive, related to our social and economic conditions, and serving ends that express the character of our organized society.
5
The growth in use of the ſ duciary concept in the face of questions over its application and implications has created what I call the 'ſ duciary paradox.'
6 As Justice La Forest bluntly states in LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., '[t] here are few legal concepts more frequently invoked but less conceptually certain than that of the ſ duciary relationship.' 7 While there is ſ duciaries; and judges.' Note also the comments of Meagher J. A. in Breen v. Williams [1994] 35 NSWLR 522, 570. 2 It is suggested that the present uncertainty that surrounds the ſ duciary concept is more perceived than real; it is the product of its unexplained and unquestioned application rather than the result of any substantive uncertainty inherent in the ſ duciary concept itself. See the discussion on this topic in L. I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law (Thomson/ Carswell, Toronto 2005) 39. 3 Indeed, the difſ culties associated with the ſ duciary concept's use in Canadian jurisprudence appear in other jurisdictions as well. Some of these difſ culties are rather obvious, as, for example, in the problematic applications of the ſ duciary concept to achieve particular results observable in Chase Manhattan Bank v. Israel-British Bank [1981] Ch. 105 and English v. Dedham Vale Properties [1978] 1 All ER 382 (Ch). 4 As Sealy indicates in an early article, 'judges in most cases have been more ready to ſ nd that the type of ſ duciary situation upon which their decision depends does or does not exist, than to say what, for that purpose, amounts to such a ſ duciary position': L. S. Sealy, 'Fiduciary Relationships' [1962] CLJ 69, 73-4. 
